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FATHERS AND FOREFATHERS



On a crisp late-summer morning in 1898, ten-year-old Franz Tügel accompanied his father on a Sunday walk through the city of Hamburg. It was one of the first times that Franz's father, a man with the kingly name of August Christian Wilhelm Ludwig Tügel, had allowed the boy to accompany him to church, and on his weekly rounds after the service. Before then Franz's father had deemed the boy too young to grasp the intellectual and spiritual implications of a church service, or to appreciate the combination of pleasure and purpose that a successful merchant's walk through his city could serve.¹ Now, however, Franz's father had finally seen fit to include his oldest son in his Sunday rituals. In time the second son would join them, but for now just the two of them shared this special ritual.

Father and son began their journey in their home neighborhood of Hamm, one of several small towns that lay within Hamburg's eastern border along the broad Elbe River.² Hamm, Horn, and the other city districts to the east and north of Hamburg's urban core were part of the great metropolis, but they still had a small-town feel that lent them a slower, calmer atmosphere. In his memoirs, a much older Franz Tügel looked back on Hamm as a "garden district" and a "vision of small-town life within a big city."³ Hamm featured broad, tree-lined streets, through which trains of horse carts regularly carried goods and people from the countryside to the city center. Many of the local passenger carts featured a surprising and delightful innovation: electric meters that automatically monitored a rider's fare and charged an appropriate and precise amount.⁴ Bridges large and small spanned the many canals that branched off the Elbe, allowing all of Hamburg's neighborhoods access to this essential river.

From the upper stories of Hamm's modest and widely spaced four-story apartment blocks, a childlike Franz could sit in a window and gaze westward toward the high towers of Hamburg's five main churches, whose steeples called out to adventurous boys and weary sailors alike. The tallest was an impressive gothic cathedral named for the patron saint of sailors, St. Nicholas. Until 1876 it was the tallest building in the world. In the 1890s, Hamburg's quiet eastern and northern towns were the perfect place for rising bourgeois merchants like August Christian to raise their families. August Christian's own father had come to Hamburg from provincial Mecklenburg—driven, as were so many others in that era, to leave the countryside to seek their fortune in the big city.⁵

On their Sunday walks, Franz and his father traced a path down the main avenues toward the city center. August Christian looked on indulgently as his son peered into the windows of shops stuffed with toys, bakeries that emitted delicious smells, and, later in the season, Christmas markets that combined both delights.⁶ Father and son soon passed through the old Berliner Tor, once a gate in the city walls that had monitored Hamburg's commerce with Brandenburg and Lower Saxony to the east. The similar Lübecker Tor had connected Hamburg with the other great Hanseatic trading cities to the north. The walls, however, were no more: Hamburg's city fathers had ordered them demolished in 1820 as a way of proclaiming that the city, in the aftermath of Napoleon's haughty occupation and compulsory fortification, would continue to assert its traditional neutrality in armed conflicts.⁷ On a map, one can still see the ghost of Hamburg's medieval walls encircling the city. After 1820, however, the encirclement comprised not barriers but bridges, houses, shops, and green spaces—especially on the west side, where a botanical garden encouraged burghers to stroll through their increasingly wealthy and confident city.

Having passed through the gates and gardens of the former walls, Franz and his father entered the increasingly narrow streets and canal passages of Hamburg's ancient urban core. In the young boy's imagination, the merchant houses there were themselves a type of fortress that was simultaneously intimidating and alluring. In his first journeys down the Steinstrasse toward his father's office building, Franz peered apprehensively through cavernous entryways into the merchant buildings' shadowy inner courtyards. He shied away from the "dark elements" who took refuge in the alleys, or who packed the areas around the canals as they loaded and unloaded goods.⁸ Many of these men lived nearby, in an area called the *Gängeviertel*, or Alley Quarter. This thieves' den had grown narrower, dirtier, darker, smellier, more crowded, and more criminal as Hamburg's population swelled. Most men living there provided useful labor at the nearby docks, harbors, and warehouses, or in the booming construction industry. Working-class women became household servants or worked in textile factories. Eventually the growing number of laborers became a problem for the city fathers. Conditions had been deteriorating rapidly, turning the city's oldest and most central area into a crime-ridden slum rife with pickpockets, robbers, and general villainy perpetrated by and upon the recently arrived masses from the countryside.

Franz's father did not allow his son to enter these dangerous districts, wanting to shield the boy from the marginal inhabitants and their questionable lifestyles. Indeed, the pair never went as far as the city's western border of St. Pauli—a haven for sojourning sailors and hence a refuge for organized crime, rough language in many tongues, and far more adult entertainments than a respectable merchant would allow his young son to encounter. St. Pauli had always been somewhat of a borderland. Its most famous street, the Reeperbahn, acquired its name from the rope-makers who could practice their trade only outside the city limits. Outside the old walls but well within Hamburg's domain, St. Pauli became home to professionals of all stripes whose trades the city needed but also disdained for their din, their stench, or their disrepute.

With the arrival of steamships in the mid-19th century, the district quickly found an infamous new purpose. Although most cities and towns locked their gates at night, the iron barriers guarding St. Pauli remained closed during the day. At night the gates swung open and welcomed the Reeperbahn's famous nightlife. Taverns opened their doors. Dance halls and theaters raised their curtains. Sailors staggered drunkenly through alleys, fought locals and each other, passed out in piles, and were robbed of any coins they had not yet spent. On certain streets, lights from back-alley windows burst into red brilliance, illuminating the women who made themselves available to men—for a price. The scene degenerated further at Altona, where the Prussian takeover in 1864 had done little to reduce prostitution, and a street with the taunting name of Große Freiheit—great freedom—was home to a structure that Hamburg's solid Protestant leaders may have considered a second Babylon—the region's largest Catholic church. St. Pauli, Altona, and similar districts were at best necessary appendages to the central work life of a port city; at worst they were a constant source of disease, destabilization, and dismay. Respectable boys and girls had to be kept as far away as possible.

As Franz began to accompany his father into the far more tightly controlled world of the bourgeois merchants, his fascination with its solidity, its productivity, and its grand promises grew into adulation. His memoirs recall his growing interest in Hamburg's industrious bustle, which he later eulogized as a vanished "old-Hamburg world."⁹ The green-tinged towers of the central churches rose above the clamor, their softly clinging bells uniting all below in marking the hours. Merchant houses clustered in the city center,

growing ever taller and more grandiose, and buzzing with trade and commerce that refused to rest, even on Sunday. The masts and white sails of ships in the harbor shone through the morning mist, while the call of steamship whistles floated up from the docks. All these sights and sounds coalesced into a vast and varied commercial network that pulsed through the canals and inner streets of a *Welthandelstadt*—a world-class international trading city.

At the peak of their Sunday journey, father and son would arrive at August Christian's offices in the newly built Dovenhof, a massive and impressive building in the middle of Hamburg's central commercial district. Although young Franz would have always known the Dovenhof as a vital part of Hamburg's commercial scene, the new building actually represented a recent change in the city's architecture. Hanseatic merchant houses traditionally featured ground-floor shops and public spaces, warehouse rooms in the rear, and upper-story living spaces. The new style eliminated the residence, shop front, and warehouse elements in order to increase the amount of office space available for rent. These new "office buildings" had caught on like wildfire in London, New York, Baltimore, and Chicago, and their gradual takeover in Hamburg therefore showed how the city imported not only goods from overseas but also methods of doing business and ways of living. This connection to the larger Atlantic world of trade, with its openness to English and American business techniques, had long been one of Hamburg's strengths. In fact, the purpose of the Tügel's Sunday stroll was to enable August Christian to keep track of the outside world, which was reflected in the letters and other weekend mail that had piled up on his desk in the Dovenhof.

While Franz's father read his post at a leisurely Sunday pace, the boy would quietly amuse himself. Perhaps he would have carefully climbed on and off the fascinating paternoster elevator, a type of elevator cab recently imported from England. Franz's father might not have allowed him to do so unsupervised, however, as these constantly moving elevators had killed several people who mistakenly climbed onto the roof of the cab and were carried upward into the gears. Franz most likely would have sat at a desk next to his father's and watched the man review his business affairs. Or perhaps he sat at the window and looked out over the lower roofs of the old merchant houses. The office gave Franz a commanding view of the city, befitting the station of a rising merchant's son who expected to learn at his father's side and someday earn his own desk at the Dovenhof.

But this was not to be. Six years later, in 1904, while the family was living in Cologne for a time, August Christian Tügel suddenly died. Within a few short months, a man who had been perfectly healthy wasted away from a rapidly growing cancer. Franz was 16, and his world changed forever with his father's death.

"I cannot describe," he later wrote, "what went through my soul in that moment. Through my deepest sorrow grew an impassioned love for the heart that had ceased to beat, but whose unending care-taking had helped create for us such an easy and carefree childhood."

But now, he wrote, the "curtain had fallen; the world of childhood was forever closed to me."¹⁰ Franz could never forget the sight of his father's coffin as it sat on the train that took the family back to their Hamburg home, on its way to be buried in the vast Ohlsdorf Cemetery. Ohlsdorf was one of the largest city cemeteries in the world, and it housed generations of Hanseatic patricians from Hamburg's historic past. August Christian now belonged to that past, yet his death was not just the end of one story. It was also, Franz wrote years later, a harbinger of the future.

"The death of my father," wrote Franz, "changed my life. Once again, I saw God's hand above me, as I had not seen since the striking pictures of biblical storybooks that I read during my earliest years in school. It gave me a powerful vision into the future of the land He wanted to show me."¹¹

Ten years later, on the April day that would have been his father's birthday, Franz Tügel took the oath that made him a Lutheran minister. He did so in overt consciousness of upholding his father's worldviews—the "healthy opinions" of August Christian that Franz said had "entered my flesh and blood" at an early age and became "as self-explanatory as daily bread."¹² These views emphasized piety, tradition, self-restraint, and, above all, a strong connection between church and state as agents of God's order in the world. For the young "arch-conservative," as Franz proudly called himself, the "fatherly heritage" of his two fathers—literal and spiritual—demanded political conclusions. "Everything that looked like revolution or revolt," he wrote, "was high treason in my eyes."¹³

Franz Tügel seems not to have considered the possibility that his conception of his father's worldview was, at best, imperfect. Franz had only known his father as a relatively distant patriarch, a man who did not share nuanced or sophisticated aspects of his beliefs with children. Like most children, Franz knew only a highly idealized version of his father, and the man's

early death prevented Franz from undergoing the periodic reevaluation of parental figures that most people experience throughout their lives. As Oscar Wilde wrote several years after Franz was born, "Children begin by loving their parents. After a time, they judge them. Rarely, if ever, do they forgive them."¹⁴ Franz never reached the stage of judgment, critique, or forgiveness. Thus his childlike love for his father remained immature, unevaluated, and ignorant of the need to see which qualities of his father's generation had failed or done harm. Franz's political ideology therefore took on qualities similar to the emotional experiences that had birthed them—and in both realms, Franz masked immaturity with bombast.

Twenty years later, on March 5, 1934, an outwardly mature and confident Pastor Franz Tügel stood proudly before the members of Hamburg's Lutheran synod. They had just voted him bishop. Tügel, now a tall man with a pencil-thin mustache and slicked-back hair, did not wear the black robes of a minister on this day of triumph. He had chosen instead to don the brown shirt and swastika armband of a Nazi stormtrooper.

"It is a noteworthy coincidence," he said, "that the synod would meet today, the same day that one year ago saw for the first time the unfurling of the swastika-flag over the balcony of the Rathaus [city hall]. On that day, we National Socialists celebrated the fulfillment of our heart's old desire."¹⁵

It had been a time of long struggle, Tügel said, not only for the state and German society, but also for a church whose authority and influence had been attacked from all sides by sinister and destructive forces. But peace was at hand in both spiritual and secular life, "now that within the church the great meaning of the National Socialist movement for the German people has been recognized."¹⁶

In response to questions about the church's future plans, Tügel responded curtly, and to great applause, "I have no program. *I am the program.*"¹⁷ He then finished his provocative address to the church he now led: "We have one solution only: In the spirit of Luther and Adolf Hitler, that church and Volk may become one heart and soul!"¹⁸

While his followers applauded the speech, Bishop Franz Tügel smoothed the contours of his uniform. Behind him, in the precise middle of the high table where the church's most notable members sat, a fellow clergyman wearing the black uniform of the *Schutzstaffel* oversaw the proceedings like a spider monitoring a well-spun web. Pastors and lay stormtroopers alike now joined in singing the first two verses of "A Mighty Fortress Is Our God," a powerful

Protestant hymn whose chorus now took on an especially aggressive tone. Before the ordination closed with the first verse of the stormtroopers' own anthem, the "Horst Wessel Lied," Franz Tügel raised his right hand in the Nazi salute.¹⁹ Leading the group in three cries of "Heil Hitler!" he pledged his loyalty: to the *Führer*, to the state that his stormtroopers had helped create, and to the long-dead father Tügel thought he was serving by assisting in the Nazi takeover of the formerly Free and Hanseatic City.

Fathers, Sons, and Stormtroopers

Although Franz Tügel was just one man, his story is typical of the stormtroopers. Tügel described the pattern more clearly and directly than most of his comrades, but dead fathers loomed large in many stormtrooper writings across a variety of media. *Sturmabteilung* (SA) personnel records teemed with orphaned, abandoned, and estranged sons. When forced to defend themselves in legal proceedings, some SA men reliably raised the specter of a dead father as a defense for committing violent acts. Dead fathers also were a strong presence in the literature the stormtroopers later produced. In an array of books, poems, and newspaper articles, stormtroopers mourned their departed forebears and vowed to fight to recover a lost heritage. This theme played to a historic heroic archetype and to recent local history alike—Hanseatic merchant patriarchs seem to have made a habit of working themselves to death while their sons were still young, while working-class fathers also often died early, due to harsh labor conditions, poor sanitation, and substance abuse.²⁰

But no matter how prevalent on an anecdotal and literary level, the SA's emphasis on dead fathers cannot be considered representative of all stormtroopers' experiences. Some of the Hamburg Nazi Party's brightest young stars, such as political leader Albert Krebs and SA general Alfred Conn, came to nationalist politics through the influence of their living fathers, and with the support of the socioeconomic circles that surrounded these patriarchs. However, their fathers did not always approve of the ultimate direction the stormtroopers chose. As Conn, Krebs, and other purportedly loyal sons would discover in the coming phases of the political conflict, living fathers at times condemned their sons' violent forms of political action, even if they sympathized with the youths' professed political goals. Living fathers also could pose overtly oppositional threats, as

the working-class sons of socialist or Communist fathers discovered when they began to join the SA after 1929. Stormtrooper novelists portrayed this conflict in working-class families using caricatures of weak socialist fathers, who caused trouble for the protagonists' families through a conflicting combination of timid helplessness, overbearing paternalism, and backstabbing treachery.²¹

Indeed, father-son relationships in that era were often violent, as many fathers—whether liberal, monarchist, nationalist, or socialist—abused their sons. Even in families where physical mistreatment was not the rule, early psychoanalytic theories, such as the Frankfurt School's "authoritarian personality," gave great weight to the patriarchal family structure as a breeding ground for violent, authoritarian politics.²² The popularity of this contested concept stemmed in part from the fact that imperial German fatherhood seemed especially heavy-handed across all social classes.²³ While elite and upper-middle-class fathers were mostly distant, cold, and demanding, lower-middle-class and working-class fathers tended to be directly abusive. A stereotypical father of this class worked 10–12 hours a day in a factory or shop, then proceeded to his local pub, and later returned to the family's small urban flat in a drunk and disagreeable mood. Once ensconced at home, he would subject his wife and children to verbal abuse that occasionally escalated to the point where he reached for his belt. Such fathers would not tolerate disagreement or discussion from those who lived under their roof.

According to the Frankfurt School, these encounters between powerful patriarchs and their dependent children had lasting consequences for both their individual and collective psychology.²⁴ This theory of the fascist father-son relationship, although intriguing and provocative when first presented, has not held up through decades of further research that has criticized its methodology, challenged its typologies, and revealed its sometimes circular logic.²⁵ The true importance of the abusive father as an explanation for the stormtroopers' violent political style therefore comes not from actual father-son relationships, but from the way stormtroopers conceptualized not only their own fathers but the men of the previous generation writ large. Whether they described these men as absent ghosts or as living disappointments, the stormtroopers' rhetorical reliance on the subject proved a key way to place themselves within a traditional and, they hoped, enduring context of legitimate social and political authority.

In politics, dead fathers are often more useful than live ones. Whether or not a stormtrooper had actually lost his father before, during, or after the Great War, most SA men fixated on a greater metaphorical sense of loss: the loss of the image of the exemplary gentleman capitalist, the merchant patriarch who had built Hamburg's glory and in whose footsteps the younger generation expected to follow. Even those whose fathers had come from outside Hamburg as part of the great throng of immigrants that swelled the city's population in the late 19th century had been raised to expect that the family would eventually establish itself in bourgeois circles. After 1918, however, stormtroopers came to believe that the prosperous Hanseatic city their fathers had bequeathed to them had fallen into decline and despair, and that their own potential to become—in the terms of historical scholarship—"gentlemen capitalists" or "hegemonic men" now proved impossible. Stormtroopers sometimes blamed their fathers for squandering their prosperity, mismanaging the empire, or turning to socialism. This confused mix of idealism and disdain persisted throughout the stormtroopers' public lives. Whether to honor their merchant fathers or to rebel against those who were socialists, SA men always claimed that they fought to resurrect a departed imperial past, to punish those responsible for destroying it, and to secure their own place as the latest generation of patriotic, prosperous leaders of a great northern city.

Hamburg's Political Heritage

To understand the psychology and motivation of the men who became Hamburg's stormtroopers, one must first understand their conception of the city itself. Its interests and its time-tested way of life, the stormtroopers claimed, were under attack and required a violent defense. Hamburg's streets and neighborhoods became the stormtroopers' trenches and battlefields. During the era of the Weimar Republic, the city's churches and taverns became fortresses and strongholds, the city hall and commercial centers became targets of political and economic conquest. But it was not the Hamburg of the late 1920s and early 1930s that dominated the stormtroopers' consciousness. These men had been born and raised into a very different Hamburg than the troubled postwar city they fought to defend. Their Hamburg was an idealized image from an earlier time—an imperial time, the prosperous and promising decades preceding the turn of the 20th

century, when both Germany and Hamburg felt young, vital, and full of promise. It was a time when the Kaiser's race to establish German colonies and achieve naval parity with Britain seemed guaranteed to stimulate commerce as never before. The series of crises caused by Wilhelm II's policies and personal belligerence had not yet shaken Anglo-German relations, nor had the *Titanic's* ignominious demise undermined the Atlantic bourgeoisie's sense of invulnerability. Before the war of 1914–1918, the hopes of Hamburg's merchant elite had not yet been battered on the rocks of the war, revolution, and general upheaval that ultimately sank the Free and Hanseatic City's long-sailing ship of state.

As children, the future stormtroopers had learned from teachers and schoolbooks to revere the German Empire and Hamburg's place within it. In some sense, however, that attitude fit poorly with Hamburg's traditional self-conception as a bastion of independence and democratic self-governance. Historians have called Hamburg a "special case."²⁶ It had been a Free Imperial City under the Holy Roman Empire since 1189, one of a few city-states allowed to run its own affairs with little interference from a distant monarch. Hamburg's advantageous position on the vital Elbe River allowed it to assist in, foster, and of course tax a vast portion of continental trade. Given the Elbe's cultural significance as a border between feudal eastern Europe and the booming merchant economies of western Europe, Hamburg became a key link in the chain connecting continental German lands to the wider world of the oceans.²⁷ Over the centuries, Hamburg helped protect the waterways, promote trade, and resist centralized imperial authority. Historians of the city's early years referred to antipiracy as "good work" in which Hamburg "honorably distinguished" itself.²⁸ In other words, the city was a responsible regional power that sought to protect trade, extend communication networks, and generally promote—although the term is anachronistic—liberal internationalism.

Hamburg used its advantageous geographic position to become one of the largest, richest, and most important towns of the medieval Hanseatic League. And while the rest of the League's cities declined in the mid-15th century, Hamburg remained a vital point of transit between the continent and the rapidly expanding English textile market.²⁹ By the 18th century it had grown increasingly prosperous, due in great part to the rise of the transatlantic trade. Unlike many other commercial cities, Hamburg accumulated its great wealth not through the export of local goods from its own agricultural

territory, but by trading goods imported from the continent's interior in exchange for overseas products.³⁰ While the fellow Hanseatic town of Bremen enriched itself through the import of raw cotton and tobacco from America, Hamburg grew wealthier still as the key transporter of East Elbian grain and German machine parts to the wider world, while also coming to dominate European trade with South America.³¹ Hamburg put a larger economic footprint on the region than any other German city, and its hinterland—a term that emerged in Anglo-German urban studies of the time—reached across all of Germany and into several other neighboring states.³²

By the turn of the 20th century, the travel guides of multiple nations described Hamburg as one of the key elements of a world economic system that had brought great prosperity to Britain, Germany, the United States, and other great northern powers. As the 1900 edition of Baedeker's famous guide reported, "Hamburg, with 680,000 inhabitants, is the largest of the three free Hanseatic towns of the German Empire, and next to London, Liverpool, and New York must be counted among the most important commercial places in the world."³³

These important commercial places shared not only economic interconnections but cultural ones as well. Hamburg's elite and bourgeois merchant classes, and those who hoped to climb into these ranks, clearly placed themselves within an Anglo-American or "northern" context. They were never English or American in their political loyalties, but they considered both of these peoples, together with the Scandinavians, the Dutch, and the "German Hanseatics," to be the torchbearers of progress and civilization. These free peoples of the north had protected the concepts of independence and free enterprise in the late feudal era, had defeated authoritarian religion during the Reformation, and had resisted the slave empires of Spain and France. In modern times, their development of industry and modern capitalism had brought the world out of darkness.

These sentiments contributed to a strong local identity that transcended even the bourgeois-liberal circles to which they most applied—indeed, even Hamburg's Nazis shared them. *Hamburg: Chronicle of the Hanseatic City*, coauthored by stormtrooper journalist Hermann Okrass, bore marked structural and thematic similarities with Anglo-American histories of Hamburg and the Hanseatic League.³⁴ The *Chronicle* began with a description of Hamburg's Saxon origins, which represented the Saxon (and Anglo-Saxon) people's "will for freedom," in contrast to the type of centralized authority found

under authoritarian conquerors like Charlemagne. Both the Anglo-American and German histories emphasized early antipiracy campaigns, although the Nazi account predictably paid far more attention to such bloodthirsty elements as the famous beheading of an Elbe pirate-king and 70 of his associates in 1400.³⁵ Both types of histories also venerated a connection to England that developed in the following centuries, as English merchants immigrated in increasing numbers to Hamburg or established seasonal trading houses there.³⁶ As Okrass admitted in the *Chronicle*, immigrants to Hamburg at that time also included sizable numbers of Spanish, Italian, and Portuguese traders. The latter group even included a significant percentage of Jews. Here the Nazi coauthors surprisingly fail to insert the expected antisemitic commentary, even though Jews hardly counted as traditional elements of Hamburg's merchant elites. While the Protestant merchant patriarchs allowed a limited number of Jews to reside in the city, Hamburg's clan-based system of family firms usually kept them from gaining influence. This system worked to some extent against the Latin immigrants too; in Hamburg, both Catholics and Jews lacked the more perfect cultural union that Anglo-Americans enjoyed with Hamburg's elite Protestant burghers.

As the Hamburg Nazis' official history of their city reveals, even extreme nationalists felt pride in Hamburg's connection to English commerce, ways of life, political attitudes, and especially the long-shared sense of reserve, propriety, and what sociologist Max Weber had recently coined as a uniquely Protestant ethic of capitalism. By the early 19th century, according to the Nazi historian of Hamburg, "life in the city took on increasingly international forms" and "English ways of life became the fashion."³⁷ He did not mean this as an insult. The Hamburg Nazis' long fascination with and affection for England persisted far longer than most realize, mainly as wary appreciation for Britain's colonial and military success.³⁸ The connection was so close that later reading lists published by the Nazified Hamburg public library recommended that National Socialists seeking a proper Germanic consciousness should read works by British and American authors, as well as stories about these nations' most famous figures. Exemplary titles included Thomas Carlyle's *Heroes and Hero-Worship*, Heinrich Bauer's *Oliver Cromwell: Battle of Freedom and Dictatorship*, biographies of Queen Elizabeth I, *The Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin*, and, in a section on great seafarers and empire-builders, works by Francis Drake, James Cook, Henry Morton Stanley, and Rudyard Kipling.³⁹ Hamburg's Nazis gave these works of Anglo-American heroism

equal prominence with German works of Hanseatic history, biographies of past German luminaries, and more predictable Nazi favorites such as the history of the swastika, the Nordic adventures of novelist Willi Vesper, and the racist theories of Adolf Hitler and Alfred Rosenberg. The Englishman Houston Stewart Chamberlain also made an appearance, as did the works of American eugenicist Madison Grant, which warned of the great civilizing Nordic races' supposed decline. Nazi hero worship in Hamburg transcended German nationality and embraced great men who lived in a variety of cities across the North Atlantic world.

All of these cities—and, to a lesser extent, imperial locales as far off as Bombay—had refashioned themselves over the course of the 19th century to become similar sites of global commerce that emphasized port construction, shipyards and naval expansion, financial services, and commodity transport.⁴⁰ A class of “gentlemanly capitalists” helmed these economies through their skillful use of finance, promotion of innovation, influence in government, and manipulation of public opinion through print media.⁴¹ As scholars of the British gentleman capitalists have described, for these men “all the world was a stage, and as risk-taking merchant princes, investors, ship-owners, insurers, lenders, bankers, land speculators, projectors and adventurers they focused their profit-seeking attention on distant horizons.”⁴² They were “commercial sophisticates” who considered themselves “citizens of the world,” or even, adding a global dimension to the traditional Germanic term for independent urban citizens, “burghers of the whole world.”⁴³ To one historian who has studied Hanseatic families in Bremen, Baltimore, and New York, the transatlantic mercantile class formed a single though diffuse unit of “cosmopolitan conservatives”—a “Conservative International” whose business, social, and family networks mutually reinforced their conception of themselves as elites who were essential to the management of both local and world prosperity.⁴⁴

The specific political forms generated by Atlantic merchant elites varied by nationality. Men later labeled “gentleman capitalists” dominated Britain’s economic and politics from above; meanwhile, their American cousins had taken far more radical steps toward direct democracy and an unlimited male franchise. German Hanseatics called their system *Honoratiorenpolitik*, or the government of notables, which was a form of republican oligarchy in which the heads of prominent merchant families managed city affairs with an emphasis on independence, risk aversion, and collective prosperity. In 1712, when

a new constitution empowered a bicameral legislature that included the Hamburg Senate and the *Bürgerschaft* (Citizens Council), this republican style of leadership became Hamburg's "perpetual, immutable, and irrevocable fundamental law."⁴⁵ This political form, according to its partisans, harkened back to ancient city-state models that combined a limited franchise with democratic modes of governance within elite circles. Practically speaking, city government functioned through committees composed of councilmen and prominent citizens. Senators guided the committees by taking expert testimony, drafting laws, and shepherding legislation through a full vote.⁴⁶ The dynamic brought economic growth, social stability, and political independence without courting the dangers of either monarchical tyranny or mob rule.⁴⁷ Hamburg's notables, like the citizens of an ancient Greek polis, assumed responsibility for the protection and promotion of their *Vaterstadt*. They earned the right to do so with their descent from established mercantile houses, their successful maintenance of that prosperity, and their conscious embrace of a corresponding set of civic virtues. These virtues—which above all included discipline, risk avoidance, and pragmatism—mandated utilitarian policies, maximal economic prosperity, and the promotion of the public good as a force to control social revolution from below. As such, the city-state conception of civic virtue was paternalistic and elitist, yet it also focused on public works and the idea that the rule of law brought security and common gain.⁴⁸ Civic values also lauded the educated middle classes. Not only merchants, but also lawyers, doctors, writers, pastors, and other intellectuals, made up Hamburg's civil society.⁴⁹

Hamburg's connection to the great Anglo-American merchant cities therefore built not only commercial and political ties but also cultural, psychological, and familial bonds. Members of Hamburg's merchant elite, and those of the professional and middle classes that aspired to join its ranks, placed great stock in metaphors associating their *Vaterstadt* with its more literal merchant patriarchs. Carl Mönckeberg, author of one of the greatest works of late 19th-century Hamburg history, dedicated his magisterial *History of the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg* to—who else?—"my honorable father," the late senator Johann Georg Mönckeberg, as well as several other male relatives who wielded great political authority in Hamburg's halls of government.⁵⁰ "There is something special," Carl wrote, "about the love for a *Vaterstadt*, just as with the love of one's own father."⁵¹ Although he admitted that some of this love came from nostalgia for one's own youth,

he emphasized that admiration for fathers and father cities persisted not because of the riches or power these fathers wielded, but because virtue inspired loyalty that endured through the generations. After declaring Hamburg's kinship with "the small cities of ancient Greece," and even with "the Israelites' ability to maintain their self-consciousness as a people through centuries of condemnation in the eyes of the world," Mönckeberg declared that "Hamburg has from the beginning of its history belonged to the cities of which the Lord has said: Let this be a city on a hill, whose light will illuminate the world."⁵²

Like America, the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg saw itself as a beacon of republican governance in the world. However, both polities were hardly favorable to the type of fully democratic politics a modern reader might expect. They instead combined concepts of independence and claims to political autonomy with limits on participation that today seem contradictory. Hamburg's political systems were both highly classist and heavily gendered, granting full political and economic rights only to those with enough property and financial independence to maintain both high socioeconomic status and practical control over aspects of city business. The voting system excluded working-class men and even many members of the middle class throughout much of the 19th century. As for women, no amount of property or wealth would bring political rights; even though elite Hanseatic women enjoyed a greater degree of financial independence than women in other European cities, that privilege did not extend to the vote.⁵³ Gender and class expressions of political hierarchy were of course intermixed, as was the case in many societies that mobilized gendered concepts of political authority and economic management. In a feat of circular logic, men of the era claimed to deserve economic and political authority because they were the heads of their households; conversely, they maintained authority over their families by citing their authority in the public sphere.

In Hamburg as elsewhere, men were firmly in charge. Not all men, however, could wield full political authority—political leaders had to conform not only to economic standards but to behavioral codes that marked them as bearers of the highest-ranking authority.⁵⁴ In addition to the staid Protestant virtues that had guided men for centuries, transatlantic mercantile society expected all men, and especially the gentlemanly elite, to partake in systems of consumption, acquisition, conquest, and production. Men's tastes and consumer choices confirmed their positions within a Victorian

cultural sphere. They wore suits of dark English wool matched with colorful waistcoats of Oriental silk, smoked cigars from Central America, ate bananas and drank coffee imported from South America, and, by the turn of the century, walked on shoes soled with rubber from the Indies. In the 19th century, cultural connections based on global imperial commercial products brought England, America, and—through Hamburg—Germany ever closer.⁵⁵ Modes of dress and their equivalents in cuisine and home decoration solidified the Atlantic cultural sphere, provided guidelines for judging who could afford to partake in polite society, and therefore added to the cost of entry for political power.⁵⁶ Fashion thus served as part of a gatekeeping system, even as generally increased prosperity and the constant influx of new residents meant that by the late 19th century these gates were harder than ever to keep closed.

Paradigms of conquest and consumption as a means of establishing masculine authority extended into the realm of sexual relationships. Merchant elites could satisfy their desires not only with women, but also secretly with lower-ranking men. Although homosexuality and adultery were still illegal and sometimes subject to state interrogation, some high-ranking men could afford to conduct secret affairs—so long as they adhered to unwritten codes that cast their sexual dalliances in a masculine right. The master of a house frequently had affairs with his servant girls. Although his wife would run the household and manage relations with servants, the master held the moral right to oversee his female servants' social contacts and police their sexual morality. He could ask intrusive questions about the company in which a girl had spent her night off, or keep close eyes on the milkman lest he linger too long over deliveries. Sometimes the men of the household became aggressively controlling. In one famous case, the son of the master assumed his father's authority and ransacked a servant's room looking in vain for a suspected lover.⁵⁷ Such egregious cases could sometimes backfire to a man's detriment, but generally male heads of households—especially when they were business owners who conformed to social expectations for high-ranking men—found themselves able to practice and abuse a high degree of patriarchal authority. The pattern represented yet another similarity between Hamburg and the other transatlantic urban centers.

Merchants' privileges within their own homes also extended to sexual contact with male servants. This type of relationship was far more secretive and publicly suppressed than contacts with female servants, as it could

endanger both partners if discovered; nevertheless, it had a well-established historical tradition as an essential component of male merchant privilege. Generally, these same-sex contacts involved an older wealthy man who made sexual overtures to a younger and socially inferior man, usually one of his servants or a soldier at a nearby garrison. Merchant masters secured trysts with inferiors through force, threat, or material inducements.⁵⁸ In aristocratic circles, same-sex relations formed a key part of patronage and client systems among nobles, as they had for Frederick the Great himself. However, in Hamburg's realm of the grand-bourgeoisie, same-sex contacts represented a system of economic rather than aristocratic domination. Unlike London, Amsterdam, and other important cities, Hamburg developed a same-sex subculture only very late.⁵⁹ By confining same-sex contacts to their homes, prominent merchants could keep allegedly destabilizing urges under control, in part by limiting their contacts to social unequals. An older, successful, and socially powerful merchant who took the "active" sexual role could often avoid sanction if he purchased sexual favors only from lower-ranking men. After all, such acts confirmed his status as the superior bearer of authority.⁶⁰

Sexual commerce of this type was a secretive and dangerous way for merchant men to exercise their social and economic power. The man who carried his consumption too far risked losing his masculine authority through a decline into decadence. Modern Europeans borrowed the stigmatizing concept of effeminacy from the ancient Greeks, who had identified the trait through a man's overconsumption of alcohol and food, an obsession with women and sex, or a descent into the underworld of prostitution, sodomy, and foppishness.⁶¹ As this last construction implies, hegemonic masculinity and the leadership of gentleman capitalists not only excluded women from political authority, it also banished from full republican citizenship a wide range of people who could not or did not conform to expected masculine traits. These people allegedly included the rough members of the working class, the dandies of the aristocracy, the shy and tentative, artists, foreigners, non-whites, Jews, and the French.

With these behaviors, Hamburg shared its conception of hegemonic masculinity with a constellation of northern European and American cities that were also led by male merchant elites. This group generally emphasized austerity, rejected ostentatious consumerism, and spurned the aspiration to gain titles, estates, and a place in the landed aristocracy. Hamburg's elite

families in fact distrusted landed power for both social and economic reasons. Put simply, titled aristocracies bred indolence, entitlement, and corruption—all traits that were not good for business. In Hamburg, bourgeois notables expected that the members of each new generation would confirm their elite status through a display of individual responsibility, morality, and self-discipline.⁶² By demonstrating these virtues, sons confirmed their worthiness to wield political power, rather than merely inheriting it.

Through the political upheavals of the late 18th century and the rising nationalism of the 19th century, Hamburg's notables steered an independent course. They sought merely to ensure that the city would run its own affairs, and they resisted being absorbed into larger states, whether French, Danish, or German. The most serious threat came from Napoleon, who like many French leaders before him resented Hamburg's close relationship with the English. According to *Okrass' Chronicle*, Hamburg "was only marginally interested in the new ideas" of the French Revolution; like the English, the people of Hamburg distrusted the revolution, as it was overly disruptive to practical affairs.⁶³ When Napoleon moved against England, he also struck Hamburg. In 1806, thousands of French troops marched into the city. They came bearing orders to arrest all English merchants, confiscate their property, and generally treat Hamburg as an outpost of the English enemy. In a sense, Napoleon was right to see Hamburg in this light. Unlike that of any other comparable city, Hamburg's Senate had long encouraged foreign merchants, particularly the English, to take up residence within its walls.⁶⁴ French troops now went on an extended hunt for these elements, going house to house in search of English merchants and bankers, whom they carted off as prisoners of war to the French fortress of Verdun.⁶⁵ Immediately following Napoleon's Berlin Decree, which banned all continental trade with England, his marshal in Hamburg forced the Senate to pass further punitive measures. Englishmen who did not surrender their property within 24 hours would be summarily executed. Hamburg's burghers had 48 hours to declare and surrender any property originating in England. All correspondence and contact with England or Englishmen were now banned.⁶⁶

The French occupation, strongly resented across the German land, particularly vexed Hamburg's citizens, as it threatened to destroy the city's commercial and cultural exceptionalism. Even after the combined troops of Britain and Prussia thwarted Napoleon's plans to dominate the continental economy, the French occupation lingered in Hamburg's historical memory,

ready to be used by Nazi historians like Okrass, who described 1815 as “one year of unbelievable suffering.”⁶⁷ Okrass chronicled the confiscation of property and punitive taxes, daily arrests and executions, thousands of citizens being forced to labor on fortifications that strengthened foreign oppression, the systematic destruction of all homes outside the city walls, and the violent eviction—on Christmas Eve, no less—of 20,000 citizens who could no longer support themselves. One thousand of them died.⁶⁸ Okrass relished these details, not just due to a stormtrooper’s sense of bloodthirstiness but because they provided a useful example of the consequences of national weakness. He continued:

These inhuman sufferings made a deep impact on the spirits of Hamburg’s population. If they had earlier stuck closely to ideas of world-citizenry, they now realized their common destiny with the other German lands, now began to feel German again, and now began to treasure their support from the greater German Volk. If they had earlier seen the world only through merchant eyes, and had only striven for their own advantage, now feelings of engagement with fellow citizens and a readiness to fight for the whole became part of their nature.⁶⁹

Okrass’ reading of these events in no way represented a unified Hanseatic consensus, but it did accurately reflect a mentality common among later nationalist generations. “A readiness to fight for the whole” was a key part of the stormtrooper mind-set, which they read backwards into historical memory as a justification for authoritarian militarism. In reality, Hamburg’s merchant elite and general political affiliation throughout the 19th century continued to adhere to the city’s traditional democratic strengths. Despite setbacks, Hamburg retained its self-governance for several more decades, during which it remained, according to Britain’s most prominent modern scholar of Hamburg, “an island of republicanism in a monarchical sea.”⁷⁰

But monarchy’s tide was rising. In the 1860s and 1870s, Prussia’s wars of German unification ended Hamburg’s official independence. To a great extent, memories of the Napoleonic occupation had indeed paved the way for this development—in Hamburg, as elsewhere in the German lands, Napoleon had taught many citizens of smaller states that the only way to preserve their independence would be to surrender it to a German

monarch. In the past, Hamburg had always been one of the only cities in Europe able to remain a major economic power without the assistance of a larger nation-state.⁷¹ This status quo, however, now seemed impossible to maintain. Prussian chancellor Otto von Bismarck thus found the Hamburg Senate more receptive than it otherwise might have been when, in 1864 and 1866, he pressured the city to participate in Prussia's wars against the Danes and Austrians. Some in the Senate and in society generally were enticed by Bismarck's skillful mobilization of long-standing resentment against the Danes, but most senators did not fully believe Bismarck's promises that a new German empire would respect Hamburg's political and economic independence. Even the doubters, however, feared that resisting Prussian plans would only bring outright annexation.⁷² The Senate thus acquiesced and joined the war, and afterward the Prussian-sponsored North German Confederation. Hamburg was the last north German territory to compromise its sovereignty in this way. In 1871, all Confederation states were absorbed into the unified German Reich, and Hamburg's 700-year tradition of formal independence came to an end.

True to the fears of those who resisted unification, Hamburg's experience under the German Reich from 1871 to 1918 weakened the city's distinctive political forms. Although some continued to see imperial Hamburg as a "foreign body" in the monarchy, most scholars have noted that traditional republican values and practices declined after unification.⁷³ Elite resistance to titles and nobility weakened as the young empire became more integrated, and its imperial and Prussian character grew more entrenched. Before 1871, only one percent of Hamburg's wealthiest merchants held noble titles; over the next 40 years, however, ten times that number accepted titles from their new Prussian monarch.⁷⁴ The shift toward aristocracy took place only among the very elite merchant families, even though many of these families saw accepting titles as a radical change that could harm a family's good name.⁷⁵ This compromise of reputation was not merely symbolic, nor was it confined to elite mercantile circles. In fact, it formed one part of a generally increasing dissatisfaction with the notables' ability to govern.

A cholera epidemic in 1892 proved a crucial breaking point between political forms. The epidemic, one incident in a century-long pattern of diseases that terrorized Europe's crowded and poorly sanitized cities, was seen as proof that the city was growing out of control. Demographic turmoil came not only from the sheer number of residents—as of 1888, half a

million—but also because these new masses increasingly clustered in dark, wet, and dirty slums. Yet the slum dwellers were not so physically distant from the city residents of longer pedigree and higher social standing. In August 1892, cholera struck Hamburg suddenly and brutally. Within a few weeks, ten thousand citizens of a city that valued propriety and dignity was suddenly hemorrhaging from all orifices, vomiting and defecating 25 percent of their bodily fluid in as little as five hours.⁷⁶ The disease—like its contemporary cousin, tuberculosis—disproportionately struck the poor and working classes, but it left none untouched psychologically.

The calamity crystallized growing doubts among Hamburg's elites and lower-class masses that the city's technocratic methods of liberal administration could manage rapid urban growth and destabilizing social change, as the notables had long guaranteed. The epidemic thus took as an additional casualty Hamburg's traditional political systems, which a wave of imperial, state-centered, and Prussian administration soon replaced.⁷⁷ The crisis also inaugurated the rise of mass politics. An expansion of citizenship and the franchise broke the elites' monopoly on political participation, birthed a politically aroused labor movement, and generated Germany's most powerful chapter of the Social Democratic Party, the SPD, which in some sense was Hamburg's first permanent political party. Before its rise, elite citizens considered parties less an expression of social class or identity than of immediate interests and specific issues.⁷⁸ The system worked because, in traditional Hamburg, all voters came from the same elite circles; they therefore found it easy to move between parties, shift alliances, and forge compromises.

The mobilization of the masses in the 1890s, however, changed both the style and the substance of political debate. Populist pressure groups arose to promote economic reform, leftist labor politics, and suffrage reform, while a new radical right conversely promoted antisemitism, militarism, and extreme nationalism. While the trend toward mass mobilization held true across the Reich, in Hamburg these new parties and pressure groups proved particularly destructive to traditional republican politics.⁷⁹ The police, which had traditionally taken its titles, uniforms, and practices from English models, refashioned itself in 1892 along Prussian lines. This new police force created a political division whose officers fanned out in disguise to spy on the labor movement.⁸⁰ As police reactions show, by the 1890s Hamburg's notables were losing power from two sides. From above

they saw their independence diminished in favor of national policymakers in Berlin, while from below there arose a newly politicized lower-middle and working class intent on breaking the elites' political monopoly.

By the dawn of the 20th century, urban growth and economic progress had paradoxically strengthened the masses. More and more of the SPD's natural constituency of reform seekers now met the property requirements needed to vote.⁸¹ In 1901, the SPD claimed its first seat in Hamburg's lower parliamentary house, the Citizens Council; almost a dozen more representatives followed in 1904.⁸² The notables still held their grip through a three-tiered voting system that further imbalanced representation, even among the citizen class—essentially, half of the 160 Citizens Council seats were saved for elected “landowners” and “notables,” with members of these top two tiers retaining the right to vote in lower elections as well.⁸³ The legitimacy of such a scheme was untenable so long as thousands of new workers continued to stream into the city and increase the potential power of the masses. Thus the notables faced a paradox: they could perhaps save themselves from the social unrest below, but only at the cost of imposing an authoritarian style of rule from above. While political elitism and assertions of social control were hardly in conflict with Hamburg's republican traditions, the Senate's 1906 plan to curtail democratic participation in Hamburg led to social unrest, economic disruption, mass demonstrations against the police, the first general strike in German history, and mass violence on the largest scale in living memory.⁸⁴ Police, overzealous in their desire to crush the revolt, caused Hamburg's vaunted republican government to appear more like Russian czarism than Anglophile democracy. The incident presaged a coming generation of increasingly brutal and violent political conflict, and few in the city still trusted paternalistic elites to manage local affairs with dispassionate concern for mutual benefit.

After the riots of January 1906 demonstrated that the city fathers had lost their hold on their father city, and as all sides grew ever more cynical, citizens' visions of the 20th-century city grew ever darker and more pessimistic. Hamburg was no longer the Hanseatic merchant town it had been for so long. Its continuing prosperity as an imperial city had come at great social cost and a high physical price: crowding, dirtiness, darkness, and disease. Hamburg was now, as socialist revolutionary Larissa Reissner described it, “as impermeable as a pilot's oilskins, steaming with moisture, reeking like a seaman's pipe, charred with the fires of the dockside bars yet standing

firm under the torrential rain, with legs set wide apart as if on deck, planted on the right and left sides of the Elbe.”⁸⁵ Industrial and human detritus choked its once-blue waterways, “disgusting black canal[s] into which factory waste flows from gaping pipes like inky vomit.” In the center of it all, the bucolic Alster, a quiet tributary of the Elbe, still provided a refuge around which the nicest houses and richest families could focus on scenes of constructed beauty. Beside an artificial watershed, they ate ice cream and drank coffee in lakeside cafés, strolled carelessly under protective parasols, and sailed small boats in a defiant assertion of premodern ways in the face of new chaos.

Workers’ quarters and electric trains now ringed the stately city center. The daily tide began to flow shortly after 6 AM. In the darkness of early morning, bourgeois merchants and unwashed laborers alike boarded squat streetcars and gleaming elevated trains, steamships ferried hundreds of thousands of workers to their places on the docks, and thousands more occupied the area in the hope of finding work. Across four bridges, the industrial underclass poured over the Elbe, a scene Reissner described as “a black oily Venice” illuminated by steamships’ searchlights. Under the Elbe itself, workers had recently finished a massive tunnel, “a bright dry tube that pumps legions of workers across from shore to shore every morning.” In a scene of the type later depicted in the dystopian film *Metropolis*, “at the end of this tunnel, elephantine lifts raise and lower this human torrent to and from the concrete exits. They move, these two lifts, screeching in their screw-like towers like two shovels unceasingly stoking living fuel into hundreds of furnace-like factories.”⁸⁶ On the rails and in the tunnels, this brutally mechanized commute brought all citizens of Hamburg together in common participation, but they could not agree on its moral meaning. Hamburg’s consensus had been fatally fractured—if it had ever existed in the first place. And if there was one thing on which the grand bourgeoisie, the squeezed middle class, and the laboring masses could agree, it was this: the shining city on a hill had become a dark metropolis, and a city of such contrasts posed a risk to all.

Hamburg’s stormtroopers had experienced this grand imperial city as children or young men. They collectively saw the city from the perspective of both the established and the insurgent classes, for they came from both social spheres. Many leading members of the Hamburg SA came from the highest-ranking merchant families, and even more of the SA’s most

significant figures came from the middle-class professional backgrounds of shop-keeping, medicine, law, and government service. The SA's mass base, in contrast, originated on the lower rungs of the social ladder. Despite these differences, stormtroopers from all social backgrounds stood united in a common psychological reaction to their father city's recent history, a position of wounded pride that they expressed as resolve to restore a lost golden age. The question was how. As youths educated in the context of an expanding imperial German nation-state, they had learned that empire—both domestically in Europe and abroad in the world—had helped to create and secure Hamburg's pride of place in an intensely competitive world system. Empire must therefore be regained.

Many of these men's later writings demonstrate the resilience of their childlike conception of Hamburg's past. The Nazi history of Hamburg, *Chronicle of a World City*, tried to reconcile the paradoxical relationship between a "Free and Hanseatic city" and a unified German empire:

Our city's historical development could well create the impression that Hamburg had placed its own interests ahead of Germany's. But it must not be overlooked that only through political independence could the Hamburgers develop the inner drive, courage for great undertakings, resilience through difficulties, and dexterity in conquering new markets that they unfurled within the German ranks. The successful deployment of these strengths for the city meant simultaneously service in German interests; for Hamburg's prestige in the world was Germany's worth in the world; Hamburg's economy was the German economy.⁸⁷

There had been, the *Chronicle* warned, a danger that "foreign efforts" could threaten to undermine Hamburg's loyalty. The solid burghers, however, resisted "in their core" these foreign "customs and morals," and therefore "stayed essentially German" while using their connection to the wider world in the service of Germany's greater ambitions.⁸⁸

Stormtrooper Hermann Okrass wrote these words, which reflect a contradictory assimilation of local tradition common to boys raised in Hamburg's late 19th century. Their history books and political culture recast Hamburg's long association with freedom and independence, and its relationship with England, as a service rendered to a mighty German empire.

Conversely, imperial strength guaranteed the city's future prosperity and world role. While not all children educated in this manner accepted such an imperialist framework, those who became stormtroopers largely embraced the narrative. As children, they had ingested ideologies that caused them to look upon war and empire as positive goods. They had also witnessed the great physical and social disruption that had resulted from, in their view, the city's departure from its traditional ways. These beliefs led the young men who became stormtroopers to volunteer for the Great War in great numbers, and later to react to the postwar republic's further changes with resentment and resistance.

Hamburg's young men had marched off to war in 1914 to protect their city's economic potential and aspirations for further growth. Many felt that they had returned four years later to a ruin, to a fallen Hamburg that had been taken over from within by a subversive mob. In reality, the halcyon world they recalled had already been swept away by a tide of rapid change—an ongoing and traumatic upheaval that, some historians have argued, itself generated the mad rush to a war intended to be a mechanism for re-forging social harmony. If that was in fact what the economic elites and populist masses alike hoped to gain through war, they failed. The war instead proved to be the most erosive tide that Hamburg had yet experienced. Afterward, the idealized golden-age Hamburg of stormtrooper memory, the city that had once stood solidly on the banks of the Elbe, had become a sort of Atlantis: a vanished world that inspired a lost generation to try to re-create its glory, never questioning whether that lost city had ever really existed as they now imagined it.

NOTES

- 1 Franz Tügel, *Mein Weg*, 1888–1946. *Erinnerungen eines Hamburger Bischofs* (Hamburg: Wittig, 1972), 8.
- 2 Note on sources: I have taken the route of this walking tour from Tügel's memoir, *Mein Weg*, which also includes detailed information on city scenes from this time. Physical descriptions of the city and its environs, in this chapter and future chapters, are based on maps, photographs, and descriptions appearing in the most popular travel guides of the time. They are, in chronological order of production: Robert Semple, *Observations Made on a Tour from Hamburg through Berlin, Gorlitz, and Breslau, to Silberberg; and Thence to Gottenburg* (London: Robert Baldwin, 1814); Albert Borchert, *Das lustige alte Hamburg. Scherze, Sitten, und Gebräuche unserer Väter* (Hamburg: F. Dörling, 1891); Adler's *Plan von Hamburg-Altona-Wandsbek und Umgebung* (Hamburg: C. Adler, 1891); Karl Baedeker, *Nordwest-Deutschland. Handbuch für Reisende* (Leipzig: Karl Baedeker, 1905); Edwin Clapp, *The Port of Hamburg* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1912); *Hamburg und Umgebung. Praktischer Rundführung* (Berlin: Albert Goldschmidt, 1912); Richters Guide-Books, *Hamburg and Its Environs: Practical Guide*, 7th ed. (Berlin and Hamburg: Verlaganstalt und Druckerei-Gesellschaft, 1913); Griebens *Reiseführer Band 7, Hamburg und Umgebung. Praktischer Reiseführer*, 24th ed. (Berlin: Albert Goldschmidt, 1913); Robert Medill McBride, *Towns and People of Modern Germany* (New York: Robert McBride & Company, 1927). Modern books of historic photography and Hamburg's urban history, which have also added to the account in this work, include: Carl Thinius, *Damals in St. Pauli. Lust und Freude in der Vorstadt* (Hamburg: Verlag Hans Christians, 1975); Jörg Duppler, *Hamburg zur See. Maritime und militärische Beiträge zur Geschichte Hamburgs* (Herford: Verlag E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1989); Joachim Paschen, *Hamburg vor dem Krieg. Bilder von Alltag 1933–1940* (Bremen: Edition Temmen, 2003); Ortwin Pelc, *Hamburg: Die Stadt im 20. Jahrhundert* (Hamburg: Convent, 2002).
- 3 Tügel, *Mein Weg*, 8–9. For the importance of traditional "hometown communities" in Germany, see Mack Walker, *German Home Towns: Community, State, and General Estate, 1648–1817* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1971). These organic communities were, however, greatly disrupted throughout the 19th century. Franz Tügel's recollection has great similarities with how Walker described traditional towns. But the parallel is simultaneously apt and misleading: apt because the suburbs consciously functioned as re-creations of the former towns within a city context, and misleading because it insists on creating an unbroken continuity with the past that did not properly exist. For Walker, as will be seen in Hamburg's case, demographic pressures internally and the state's external pressure to cede control doomed town self-governance across Germany by the 1870s.
- 4 Adler, *Adler's Plan*, 23–25.
- 5 On August Christian Tügel's background, see Tügel, *Mein Weg*, 4–6. On the large-scale movement to Hamburg during the imperial period, see Richard Evans, "'Red Wednesday' in Hamburg: Social Democrats, Police, and Lumpenproletariat in the Suffrage Disturbances of 17 January 1906," *Social History* 4, no. 1 (1979): 19–22.
- 6 Tügel, *Mein Weg*, 9.
- 7 Griebens *Reiseführer, Hamburg und Umgebung*, 60.

- 8 Tügel, *Mein Weg*, 10.
- 9 Tügel, *Mein Weg*, 10.
- 10 Tügel, *Mein Weg*, 35.
- 11 Tügel, *Mein Weg*, 35.
- 12 Tügel, *Mein Weg*, 40, 218.
- 13 Tügel, *Mein Weg*, 218.
- 14 Oscar Wilde, *An Ideal Husband* (Boston and New York: C. T. Brainard, 1909/1895), 95.
- 15 Tügel, *Mein Weg*, 430.
- 16 Tügel, *Mein Weg*, 431.
- 17 Tügel, *Mein Weg*, 434.
- 18 Tügel, *Mein Weg*, 435.
- 19 Tügel, *Mein Weg*, 436.
- 20 On the universal elements of this theme, see Joseph Campbell, *Hero with a Thousand Faces* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1949). Locally, Lars Maischak demonstrated the early death of Hanseatic merchant men in "A Cosmopolitan Community: Hanseatic Merchants in the German-American Atlantic of the Nineteenth Century" (dissertation in history, Johns Hopkins University, 2005), 101.
- 21 As in Bernhard Voss, *Willi Dickopp. Aus dem Tagebuch eines unbekanntenen SA Mannes* (Rostock: Bernhard Voss, n.d.).
- 22 Wilhelm Reich, *The Mass Psychology of Fascism* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1970/1933); Max Horkheimer, ed., *Autorität und Familie* (Paris: Alcan, 1936).
- 23 For more about domestic violence by imperial German men, see Volker Berghahn, *Imperial Germany, 1871–1918: Economy, Society, Culture, and Politics* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005), 72–73.
- 24 T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), 6.
- 25 John Levi Martin, "'The Authoritarian Personality,' 50 Years Later: What Lessons Are There for Political Psychology?" *Political Psychology* 22, no. 1 (March 2001): 1–26.
- 26 P. E. Schramm, *Hamburg. Ein Sonderfall in der Geschichte Deutschlands* (Hamburg: Christians, 1964). Schramm's term has become a rallying point for historians of Hamburg, who have taken the term as a point of pride for the city even as they critique the accuracy of a "special case." For one such critique, see Mary Lindemann, "Fundamental Values: Political Culture in Eighteenth-Century Hamburg," in Peter Uwe Hohendahl, ed., *Patriotism, Cosmopolitanism, and National Culture in Hamburg: Public Culture in Hamburg 1700–1933* (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2003), 17–32.
- 27 Erik Lindberg, "The Rise of Hamburg as a Global Marketplace in the Seventeenth Century: A Comparative Political Economy Perspective," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 5, no. 3 (2008): 648.
- 28 Karl Baedeker, *Northern Germany as Far as the Bavarian and Austrian Frontiers* (Leipzig: Karl Baedeker, 1900), 163.
- 29 William E. Lingelbach, "The Merchant Adventurers at Hamburg," *American Historical Review* 9, no. 2 (1904): 267. See also Philippe Dollinger, *The German Hansa* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), 281–311.
- 30 Lindberg, "The Rise of Hamburg," 648.

- 31 Maischak, "A Cosmopolitan Community," 46–47. See also Victor Böhmert, "Die Stellung der Hansestädte zu Deutschland in den letzten 3 Jahrzehnten," *Vierteljahrsschrift für Volkswirtschaft und Kultur* 1 (1863): 73–115.
- 32 The term *hinterland* itself reflects a high degree of intercommunication among English- and German-speaking scholars of urban spaces—the word was originally German but quickly caught on in English, French, and Italian. On theories of Hamburg's hinterland in the context of larger British "hinterland studies" of the mid-20th century, see F. W. Morgan, "The Pre-War Hinterlands of German North Sea Ports," *Transactions and Papers (Institute of British Geographers)* 14 (1956): 45–55; Guido G. Weigend, "The Problem of Hinterland and Foreland as Illustrated by the Port of Hamburg," *Economic Geography* 32, no. 1 (1956): 1–16; and the founding text of the discipline, A. J. Sargent, *Seaports and Hinterlands* (London: A. and C. Black, 1938).
- 33 Baedeker, *Northern Germany*, 162.
- 34 Johannes Sass and Hermann Okrass, *Hamburg: Chronik einer Hansestadt* (Hamburg: Hamburger Tageblatt, 1941), 8. Sass claims first billing on the title, but Okrass exercised significant control in his capacity as editor of the Nazis' Hamburg newspaper, which published the volume.
- 35 Sass and Okrass, *Hamburg*, 20–21.
- 36 Sass and Okrass, *Hamburg*, 26–27.
- 37 Sass and Okrass, *Hamburg*, 45.
- 38 To some extent, the Nazis tried to foster Anglophilic elements within the party at large, but this fight was a losing battle, even in Hamburg, once it became clear that Britain would stand in the way of Nazi war plans. See Gerwin Strobl, *The Germanic Isle: Nazi Perceptions of Britain* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
- 39 Emma Schiller and Willi Wendling, *Nordischer Gedanke und nordische Leistung* (Hamburg: Hans Christian, 1938).
- 40 Sandip Hazareesingh, "Interconnected Synchronicities: The Production of Bombay and Glasgow as Modern Global Ports ca. 1850–1880," *Journal of Global History* 4 (2009): 7.
- 41 See P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, 1688–1914* (Harlow, England: Longman, 1993). Cain and Hopkins' work kicked off a larger debate about the concept of gentlemanly capitalism and its relevance for the rise of the British empire. See Raymond E. Dumett, *Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Imperialism: The New Debate on Empire* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999); Anthony Webster, *The Debate on the Rise of the British Empire* (Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 2006). For comparative perspectives on these debates, which places "gentlemanly capitalism" in a larger global context, see John Darwin, "Globalism and Imperialism: The Global Context of British Power, 1830–1960," in Akita Shigeru, ed., *Gentlemanly Capitalism, Imperialism, and Global History* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 43–64.
- 42 H. V. Bowen, "Gentlemanly Capitalism and the Making of a Global British Empire: Some Connections and Contrasts, 1688–1815," in Shigeru, *Gentlemanly Capitalism*, 20–21.
- 43 Bowen, "Gentlemanly Capitalism." See also M. Daunton, "'Gentlemanly Capitalism' and British Industry 1820–1914," *Past and Present* 122 (1989): 119–158.
- 44 Maischak, "A Cosmopolitan Community," 7, 16.

- 45 Lindemann, "Fundamental Values," 18. Ironically, this constitution came about through the intercession of Holy Roman Emperor Joseph I, whose imperial commission resolved a dispute between Hamburg's political and religious factions that had been a source of conflict since the 1680s. See Gerd Augner, *Die kaiserliche Kommission der Jahre 1708–1712. Hamburgs Beziehung zur Kaiser und Reich zu Anfang des 18. Jahrhunderts* (Hamburg: Verein für Hamburgische Geschichte, 1983).
- 46 Richard Comfort, *Revolutionary Hamburg: Labor Politics in the Early Weimar Republic* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1966), 16.
- 47 Lindemann, "Fundamental Values," 19.
- 48 Katherine Aaslestad, *Place and Politics: Local Identity, Civic Culture, and German Nationalism in North Germany during the Revolutionary Era* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2005), 33–45.
- 49 Aaslestad, *Place and Politics*, 56–68.
- 50 Carl Mönckeberg, *Geschichte der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg* (Hamburg: H. D. Verstehl, 1885). Carl's son, whom he named for the boy's grandfather, himself went on to become First *Bürgermeister* during the 1890s. It is his name that Hamburg's famous shopping street bears.
- 51 Mönckeberg, *Geschichte der Freien*, 1.
- 52 Mönckeberg, *Geschichte der Freien*, 2.
- 53 Maischak, "A Cosmopolitan Community," 101–109.
- 54 While the exact behaviors and traits expected of male leaders vary over time, most societies come to laud one type of adult male identity over all others. It then becomes what scholars call "hegemonic masculinity"—the type of male identity that grants men who conform to its traits political, economic, and personal power over women, children, and nonconforming men. See R. W. Connell, *Masculinities*, 2nd ed. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005), 76–84. The "patriarchal dividend" gained thereby includes authority, honor, the ability to command obedience, as well as a number of legal and material benefits (Connell, p. 82). Hegemonic men—in Hamburg's case, the merchant elites and those lower-ranking men who could best imitate elite forms of family life—also claim the exclusive right, based on their moral standing as the proper kind of man, to use violence to defend their privileges, to turn back systemic challenges, and to bolster their own position vis-à-vis other men (Connell, p. 83). The specific qualities of an era's hegemonic masculinity vary with economic and social conditions, and they are constantly under challenge. (For modern examples, see Lynne Segal, "Changing Men: Masculinities in Context," *Theory and Society* 22, no. 5, Special Issue: Masculinities [1993]: 625–641.) However, hegemony implies the ability of the reigning group to convince others in society that the hierarchy is natural, normal, universal, and irresistible. Mike Donaldson, "What Is Hegemonic Masculinity?" *Theory and Society* 22, no. 5, Special Issue: Masculinities (1993): 645.
- 55 Richard Evans, "Family and Class in the Hamburg Grand Bourgeoisie 1815–1914," in David Blackbourne and Richard Evans, eds., *The German Bourgeoisie: Essays on the Social History of the German Middle Class from the Late Eighteenth to the Early Twentieth Century* (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), 115–139.
- 56 Maischak, "A Cosmopolitan Community," 23. See also Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Capital: 1848–1875* (New York: Vintage, 1996/1975), 230–248, 277–302.

- 57 Katharina Schlegel, "Mistress and Servant in Nineteenth Century Hamburg: Employer/Employee Relationships in Domestic Service, 1880–1914," *HistoryWorkshop* 15 (1983): 71.
- 58 Jakob Michelsen, "Von Kaulleuten, Waisenknaben, und Frauen in Männerkleidern. Sodomie im Hamburg des 18. Jahrhunderts," *Zeitschrift vor Sexualforschung* 9, no. 3 (1996): 205–237.
- 59 Jakob Michelsen, "Die 'Blame' des Senatsekretärs Schlüter. Ein Sodomiefall aus dem Hamburg des 18. Jahrhunderts," *Frühneuzeit-Info* 16, nos. 1 & 2 (1996): 59.
- 60 Michelsen, "Die 'Blame,'" 58–60.
- 61 Kathleen Wilson in Philippa Levine, ed., *Gender and Empire* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2007), 18–19. On Greek conceptions, see George Mosse, *The Image of Man: The Creation of Modern Masculinity* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1998), and David Halperin, *One Hundred Years of Homosexuality: And Other Essays on Greek Love* (London and New York: Routledge, 1989).
- 62 Richard Evans, *Death in Hamburg* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 560–563.
- 63 Sass and Okrass, *Hamburg*, 45.
- 64 Lindberg, "The Rise of Hamburg," 656.
- 65 Lingelbach, "The Merchant Adventurers," 283.
- 66 Lingelbach, "The Merchant Adventurers," 283.
- 67 Sass and Okrass, *Hamburg*, 48.
- 68 Sass and Okrass, *Hamburg*, 48.
- 69 Sass and Okrass, *Hamburg*, 48–49.
- 70 Evans, *Death in Hamburg*, 2.
- 71 Lindberg, "The Rise of Hamburg," 654.
- 72 On Hamburg's relationship with Prussia in the last years of the Vormärz, see Detlef Rogosch, *Hamburg im Deutschen Bund 1859–1866. Beiträge zur Deutschen und Europäischen Geschichte Band 2* (Hamburg: Krämer, 1990).
- 73 Ekkehard Böhm, "Wirtschaft und Politik in Hamburg zur Zeit der Reichsgründung," *Zeitschrift des Vereins für Hamburgische Geschichte* 64 (1978): 52.
- 74 Dolores L. Augustine, "Business Elites of Hamburg and Bremen," *Central European History* 24 (1991): 2, 134. Augustine notes that the elite merchants of Hamburg and Berlin were therefore, by the period 1907–1911 at least, more similar to each other in this and some other respects than previously believed.
- 75 Evans, *Death in Hamburg*, 561.
- 76 Evans, *Death in Hamburg*, vii, 227.
- 77 Evans, *Death in Hamburg*, viii.
- 78 Comfort, *Revolutionary Hamburg*, 16.
- 79 Jan Palmowski's analysis of Frankfurt reveals similarities with Hamburg at this time. See *Urban Liberalism in Imperial Germany: Frankfurt am Main, 1866–1914* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). For the national picture, see Brett Fairbairn, "Political Mobilization," in Roger Chickering, ed., *Imperial Germany: A Historiographical Companion* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), 303–342, and Chickering, *We Men Who Feel Most German: A Cultural Study of the Pan-German League, 1886–1914* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984).

- 80 Richard Evans, *Kneipengespräche im Kaiserreich. Die Stimmungsberichte der Hamburger Politischen Polizei 1892–1914* (Hamburg: Rohwolt, 1989), 10–14.
- 81 The SPD had already come to dominate Hamburg's delegation to the national Reichstag, since these votes were based on universal male suffrage. Locally, between two rounds of suffrage controversies in 1896 and 1906, the SPD's growing power seemed poised to increase its influence and allow it to join forces with liberal elements that had previously turned against the labor movement. But possibilities for a new left-liberal cooperation quickly faded as the SPD became increasingly self-confident and unwilling to accept traditional terms of political debate. See Jennifer Jenkins, "Social Patriotism and Left Liberalism: The Hamburg People's Home, 1901–1914," *German History* 21, no. 1 (2003): 33–35. Jenkins argues that both elite and working classes tried in this brief window to use cultural forms—in this case, an educational project borrowed from England—to unite the classes.
- 82 Richard Evans, "'Red Wednesday' in Hamburg: Social Democrats, Police, and Lumpenproletariat in the Suffrage Disturbances of 17 January 1906," *Social History* 4, no. 1 (1979): 3–5.
- 83 For a useful review of the tiered system, see Comfort, *Revolutionary Hamburg*, 15–18.
- 84 Evans, "'Red Wednesday,'" 4. Hamburg had already seen massive strikes over labor issues, the largest in 1892, but this strike transcended specific workplace grievances and extended into a massive social protest.
- 85 Larissa Reissner, *Hamburg at the Barricades and Other Writings on Weimar Germany* (London: Pluto Press, 1977).
- 86 Sass and Okrass, *Hamburg*, 62.
- 87 Sass and Okrass, *Hamburg*, 62.
- 88 Sass and Okrass, *Hamburg*, 63.